Every team uses decoy runs. Bayern Munich tied the timing of the pass and the third-man run to the moment the decoy finished his run against Arsenal. The timing between the decoy, third man, and passer was unlike anything I’ve ever seen before.

There are three players to watch.

1. The player with the ball, the passer.
2. The player making a run to drag defenders away from space, the decoy run.
3. The player looking for and waiting for that decoy run to create the space they need to get open, the third man.

In its simplest form, a decoy run drags defenders away from the space you want to attack, and then that frees up space for a pass. You ignore the decoy run and pass to the third man once the space opens.

Without the decoy run, the pass into that third man is blocked off. There is a defender between the passer and receiver.

Once the decoy makes the run, the passing lane opens and the third man can step into that space to receive the ball.

It’s rare to see a team time the third man’s run and the pass to the exact moment the decoy finishes their run. I’ve never seen it done this deliberately, live.

As the first half between Bayern Munich and Arsenal progressed, it became apparent something was happening with Bayern Munich’s off-the-ball movement that was disruptive. This was it.

You could see it in the eyes of the third man. They were scanning for that decoy run, and they had to have the patience to wait for the run to finish to then make their run.

The instinct is to go the moment you see the decoy move, but that would ruin the whole action.

The defenders bite on the decoy. The pass never goes there. They think the danger has passed — and that’s exactly when the third man arrives.

It is like that scene in Elf. He’s opening the jack-in-the-box, nothing happens. He doesn’t know which one is going to scare him. Then finally, when he least expects it, out comes the jack-in-the-box.

I can tell it is deliberate because of the way in which the third man holds their run and then takes off running at a full sprint once the decoy finishes their run. Then the passer knows to look for a second run. He scanned to see the decoy run ball side and then looked to the far side for the third man run. It was never a surprise to any of those three players. It was practiced.

This off-the-ball movement is what led to Bayern Munich’s first goal.

Lennart Karl, the decoy, checks forward towards the ball and then makes a curved run to his right to drag the left center-back away from the right side of the pitch. Then, once Serge Gnabry, the third man, sees that movement, he initiates his run to attack the space on the wing, and the pass is played to him over the top.

You’ll notice in each of these examples that the player that was defending the space, blocking the pass into the space, is dragged away by the decoy, and then when the pass is played into that space, that defender has to pivot away from the decoy and turn to switch to marking the third man to defend the pass.

That pivot and turn from the defender is what frees up Karl for the pass from Gnabry for the goal. The left center-back follows Karl, then the defender pivots and turns to challenge the pass to Gnabry. That pivot and turn opens a gap for Karl to slip in behind the left center-back once Gnabry passes on his first touch.

The decoy run freezes the defense. They think the play is dead, and then you hit them with the third man run.

Everyone is drawn towards the decoy, then they are drawn to the third man, and then finally the decoy makes the run to the far post.

Pass ball side, lay it back, pass far side, and then the decoy is free again on the far side. You can ignore the decoy initially, but they’ll be peeling off to the far post for the tap-in if you can find them.

This movement from the third man gave Bayern Munich the illusion of constant motion even though patience and waiting — no movement from the third man — is key to this play’s success.

Other teams should look to copy this because it is disruptive and overwhelming.