Teams are becoming more successful at passing long, in the air, because they are prioritizing placing more players around the header to win the second ball. You do not have to win the header, but you must win the second ball.

There are three zones.

Zone 0 — the zone of conflict. The ball is kicked into this zone, and this is where the header is being challenged by a defender and an attacker.

Zone 1 — the zone of mutual support. Players close in around the challenge, ready to collapse toward the ball the moment contact is made to claim the second ball.

Zone 2 — the co-operation zone. Players on the fringes wait to assist the player who escapes with the ball.

There are two key advantages the attacking team has.

They can organize while the defending team reacts. The defender reacts by attempting to clear the ball and must generate power on the header. The attacker, meanwhile, can redirect the header downward into areas where supporting players are positioned.

The defender’s task is to clear the ball beyond those orbiting nearby, but the attacker can use their body to restrict the defender’s ability to get full power on the clearance. The defender can’t afford to let the attacking team take advantage of their overload.

Because the attacking team just needs to limit the effectiveness of the defender’s ability to head the ball away from the other attacking players that surround the ball, you don’t need to have a tall, physically imposing forward heading the ball. It helps, but it’s not a requirement. You just need someone who can put off the defender enough to redirect it into the path of the overload your other attackers create.

You will see this at many teams across the sport of football, but two Premier League teams that lack physical strength in the midfield or forward lines but excel at overloading the zone of mutual support during aerial duels are Manchester United and Manchester City.

Haaland is improving at heading, but he would admit heading the ball with his back to goal and with a man on his back, contesting headers, is not a big strength of his, despite his big frame. He admitted before the season started that he was practicing extra to improve his heading. With Sesko not starting every game for United, they’ve had to find creative ways to make their surrounding overloads count when they kick the ball long to smaller forwards like Mount, Cunha, or Mbeumo.

It’s not like Arsenal, where they are incredible at finding these overloads near the ball, incredible at coordinating movement when they kick it long, and then they have the tall, physical players to outmuscle you. These teams with the physical disadvantage need to get creative to win the second ball.

That is 6 ft 5 in Virgil van Dijk and Alexis Mac Allister up against 5 ft 7 in Bryan Mbeumo. Mbeumo jumped high in this example, but not high enough to win the header against Virgil. Virgil alone is winning that header nine times out of ten.

Manchester United aren’t intending to ‘win that header’—all they want is the second ball. Virgil van Dijk could head it down to Gravenberch and count it as a header won, but Bruno will be there to win the duel, winning the ball. Who won the header then in the end? Well, Manchester United have the ball.

Bruno Fernandes comes swooping in to create an overload in the zone of mutual support. Their full focus is long ball, second ball, then close combinations, and then transitions into space.

Bruno Fernandes wins the ball, and now we have a mini breakout forming with Virgil van Dijk in a compromised position. Bruno passes out to Amad Diallo, who is on the outside zone, the co-operation zone. Amad waits, and now he is activated, and the entire attack is activated with gaps in Liverpool’s defense. Alexis Mac Allister is writhing on the floor.

Liverpool are at a disadvantage because they didn’t prioritize winning the second ball. They were spaced out and outnumbered.

Amad Diallo carries forward, Bryan Mbeumo beats Virgil van Dijk and Ibrahima Konate to the ball, and United have the opening goal in the first minute of the game from one long ball, a header, two passes, and a shot.

You will often see Bruno Fernandes drift into that orbit, lurking to attack the second ball, or Jeremy Doku will move inside to overload the area in front of Erling Haaland for Manchester City when Haaland has his back to goal. There are other reasons why these teams overload the center of the pitch, but this is one of the main reasons why. They need the quick and intelligent players close in, focused on filling the gaps to act as the plus one to win those second balls.

Pep Guardiola always brings up second balls in interviews and press conferences. Manchester City only conceded one goal from a corner in the first eight games of this season. The joint top best team at defending corners. In response to why they conceded so few goals from corners, Pep explains that it is “because we were controlling the second balls, our pace, and our control was much, much [better]. In these games, the best way to defend is like that.” This fixation on ‘controlling’ second balls has a knock-on effect on how teams defend set pieces because now they are constantly practicing in-game. It becomes a habit to have someone there waiting to pick up the ball when it is knocked down.

This is not a new revelation. Teams have been doing this for several decades. There seems to be more of an emphasis on this aspect of the game now in teams you wouldn’t normally suspect. I would not be surprised if we see more and more use of vertical space. Lifting the ball off the ground isn’t a sin if you know how to maintain possession. In the past, it was a way to relieve pressure but now it is a direct threat to the balance of a compact defense. It creates imbalances.