Numbers like 4-4-2, 4-3-3, 3-4-3, and 5-2-3 describe the formation to help us quickly visualize how players are arranged on the pitch, but that is our interpretation of the tactic. What is being communicated by the coach to the players is what matters.

As Pep Guardiola said, “I thought it was a 4-3-3, 4-2-3-1, or telephone number my wife.”

We try to translate what we see into words, but the game has evolved to be much more dynamic in and out of possession, managers don’t care what we call it.

You’ll never see me use those numbers when I write because, first, I think it oversimplifies a complex process; second, it makes the reader or listener assume the formation is fixed; and third, it is a definitive statement to say “Chelsea are using a 3-4-3 formation.”

I’m on the outside looking in. What if the coach views it as a 5-2-3 instead and is communicating that to the players? That formation change represents a shift in mindset on the part of the players on the pitch. One formation is more offensive and the other more defensive.

I think it is our job to try to understand what the players are thinking, not what we want the players to think. If I can get a better understanding of what is actually being communicated to the players, then that makes it easier to describe why certain actions happened during a match and to diagnose problems.

An example of this comes from former Wolves manager Gary O’Neil, when he described the formation Wolves used to beat Chelsea in this Coaches’ Voice video. For context, in the video, Gary has set up his tactics board to show his team playing in a 4-4-2 formation:

We had Toti Gomez playing left-back, Craig Dawson left-side center-back, Max Kilman on the right, and Nelson Semedo in a right-back position. Rayan Ait-Nouri actually played left midfield. A lot of people watching the game would have seen us more as a back five because [out of possession] Ryan [Ait-Nouri] had a job to do against [Malo] Gusto, sort of tracking him down, but Ryan was the left of a midfield four.

Gary then goes on to detail every aspect of their plan and mindset throughout the game—how they held back and defended in a way that was more passive—but he admitted:

We used to like to be quite aggressive without the ball, but we didn’t feel like we needed to on the day.

[…] It was a really unique, solid away-from-home performance because normally, as a coach, I love getting pressure on the ball. I want Pablo [Sarabia] to jump, I want Pedro Neto to jump, I want us to be aggressive, I want the back line to come up when we jump, and I want us to restrict the spaces.

When you see the lineup on TV during the pre-match or the analysis after the match, no one would have described it the way Gary O’Neil described it—as a 4-4-2, midfield four. A back five is a defensive formation on paper. They held back to counter how Chelsea played, but deep down the players—Rayan Ait-Nouri in particular—were normally instructed to think offensively.

This is a common theme for teams that “play in a back five” on paper. Take Manchester United, for example. When they don’t have the ball, Amad Diallo plays as a “right wing-back” and will retreat back to help the defense in what looks like a back five. But with the ball, you could classify him more as a right-sided midfielder. What formation number do you assign then, if that is the true intention from Ruben Amorim? To me, they’re playing in a back four when they have the ball—the formation the media and fans want the team to play—but because they “play in a back five” on paper, they get typecast as a defensive team.

That is why I like to stick to describing each individual’s position or role within the team, and if necessary, sub-structures (i.e., 3-2 at the back, 2-3, back four, back five, etc.). One moment a player can be playing left wing, then attacking midfield, and then they might drop back to left-back or left wing-back. That requires a longer explanation, but I feel that’s a more accurate representation of what is actually happening.