Tottenham’s use of a back four or back five should be situational based on the opposition they face. The most interesting difference between the two options was the way in which the defenders jumped out to help in the man-to-man press.

Against Arsenal, Newcastle United, and Bayern Munich in preseason, Tottenham used a back four.

In each match, they used a similar pattern to press against the opposition’s buildup. The second line would man-mark, the wide players would man-mark, the striker man-marks, but one player from that second line would jump out in a sprint to challenge the ball. That pressures the pass forward. The wide areas and second line are both tightly marked.

This pressing structure is designed to force the pass into the free man on Tottenham’s left side, the ball side, so that the left center-back can jump from the back line to challenge that first forward pass. It is usually the first pass forward, but it doesn’t have to be, and the left center-back has to be ready to jump once the pass is played.

When the left center-back jumps, the entire backline shifts over to cover for the left center-back. The right center-back is always passive covering.

In this scenario the right center-back, Cristiano Romero, would be passive, covering for the left center-back, Kevin Danso. They don’t switch responsibility, meaning if the ball is on Romero’s side, he does not then become active. One center-back is active, normally the left center-back, and the other center-back is passive. And the player jumping out from the second line, usually a midfielder, to press will almost always come from the far side.

In the UEFA Super Cup against PSG, Tottenham used a back five. I was not surprised that they were resolute in defense. The way in which the defense pressed changed, and the interesting part is not how it changed; it is who became active and who became passive.

To maintain that constant pressure on the ball, they have to remain man-to-man. Every forward pass is still contested heavily until a tackle is made. That hasn’t changed.

What changes is now the central center-back, Cristian Romero, jumps forward, becoming the active defender, helping challenge any forward pass into the central free man beyond the second line.

The left center-back and right center-back then become passive, covering for the central center-back, and both outside center-backs shift over to close the gap down the middle that the central center-back vacated.

You would expect Kevin Danso or Mickey Van de Ven to be chosen to be the active defender, because when they are in a back four, those two are the left center-back. The left center-back was always active. They are used to being the active defender. But the roles are reversed; Cristian Romero is the active defender.

Cristian Romero is a naturally aggressive defender, but it takes a lot of intelligence to switch between an active mindset one game, pressuring the ball, jumping, and maintaining positional awareness once you disengage from the challenge versus a passive mindset, scanning and being cautious, covering, and not committing because you are that last line of defense. And that takes a lot of organization and intelligence for the rest of the team to be able to seamlessly switch between the two structures.

We saw at Brentford, against tougher opposition and/or when they lacked depth due to injuries, Thomas Frank would elect to use a back five, and when they felt they had enough cover in defense, they would use a back four. More often than not they didn’t have the depth off the bench to choose from; the lineup picked itself based off who was fit.

Thomas Frank is a manager that adapts the game plan to the opponent, whereas his predecessor, Ange Postecoglou, had his team play his way and only his way regardless of the opponent. I respect both ways of approaching a game because both take guts, but both have their downsides.

Frank’s way takes guts because of the restraint, organization, and intelligence required on the part of the players and staff to adapt the way they play game by game. In one game you are playing one role, and in another game you are playing another. Sure, you could over time develop separate game plans to play against similar opposition to build up that consistency in each system, but that takes time. It’s best to stick to one way of playing until you build up that familiarity.

The downside is what you saw against PSG. You lose an important set of players to substitutions, the opposition makes a few key adjustments, and it is harder to counter adjustments in-game to a strategy made for that opponent. A back five and a back four require the correct personnel. If you have already made substitutions, there are too many variables in play to make the large-scale adjustments needed to counter those adjustments by the opponent. You have to carry on, power through, and try to continue using what has worked in that game to not surrender momentum. That’s when a two-nil lead in the 85th minute can turn into a two-two draw and penalties by the 93rd minute.

When you adapt the way you play to the opponent you are proactive to start and reactive to the changes, with less options to fix the new issues.

Whereas if you are playing your way, and only your way, it can be easier to counter those adjustments because your weaknesses would be more noticeable, the team has more practice time in that system or structure, and you should be able to proactively adjust by subbing in personnel to defend against the new issues you are facing. It is easier to be more proactive towards the end of the game. That’s the upside. The downside is that naturally, you become more stubborn and unwilling to change mid-game because why change what has worked in the past?

The luxury for Thomas Frank is that he has more quality in-depth in attack at Tottenham, with a better defense. Unlike at Brentford, he should not have to have his strategy be dictated by injuries. If one man went down at Brentford, there was no one of similar quality on the bench. Except for Mohammed Kudus, no other player stands out, but the rest of the players are all fairly equal. It will be hard to keep those attacking players like Dejan Kulusevski, Wilson Odobert, Brennan Johnson, and Mathys Tel on the bench.

While a back five could provide short-term stability and simplify play against stronger opponents, a back four is better suited to the team’s current personnel for the long term unless they plan on letting those players go.