Tactics Journal

Be Your Best is the VR football app to improve your vision, decision making, and cognitive skills. Sign up.

If you sign up using this link I will earn a commission.

• You either reinvent yourself or you die

  07 September 2024

  Pay attention to Manchester City at the start of the season because, as Rodri says about Pep Guardiola, “He is never satisfied with keeping things exactly as we played last season, because your competition is always going to be analyzing last season.”

  Rodri writing in The Players’ Tribune:

  When I had the chance to move to City the next summer, it was a dream for me. I had spoken to Sergio Busquets before I agreed to the move, and he told me, “Pep? He is going to make you a better player. But he is never, never, never going to stop pushing you. You will never be finished.”

  Sergio had the same role with Pep, and he achieved so many great things, so I put a lot of trust in his words. And he was completely right. To me, the unique thing about Pep is that he is always one step ahead. He is always evolving before the game around him can evolve. He is never satisfied with keeping things exactly as we played last season, because your competition is always going to be analyzing last season. You don’t win four Premier League titles in a row by standing still. You either reinvent yourself or you die.

  That is what gives Manchester City an edge over everyone else. By the time you fully analyze one strategy, he has already created a new one. Pep Guardiola is a tactical Whac-A-Mole.

  In order to be the top team, you have to think the opposite of what everyone else is thinking.

  Why think like those that are losing, especially those that are copying you? By the time they’ve copied you, you’ve already created a new system that beats that old system.

  The key point though is that you can see it coming. This is where microanalysis comes in. They try one thing one game, and then another the next, and then they’ll go on a series of consecutive matches with one specific change.

  The most obvious one: Josko Gvardiol was played as a high-advanced fullback on the left last season, operating almost as a left-winger in possession. Turns up for preseason this summer, now he’s a defensive fullback operating as a left center-back in a back-three in possession. He gets forward now, but not in the same way.

  That experiment—a successful experiment—is now stored. It worked; Gvardiol is fully confident. Pair that with several other experiments, and you have a completely new system. They can flip between different trialed tactics whenever they want.

  They’re constantly running those little experiments all season. You have to pay super close attention because the experiment could run for fifteen minutes, a full half, a full game, several games, or half a season. They try it, it works or fails, they continue using it, or then they move on, and they usually revisit it in a week, a month, a year, or several years.

• The ability to forget his mistakes and move on

  06 September 2024

  In the words of pro golfer Luke Donald, Tiger Woods’ “ability to forget his mistakes and move on” was what made him a better golfer than everyone else. Everyone focuses on the technique, but we forget about the mental side of playing a game.

  An excerpt from the book “Best Loser Wins” by high-stakes stock trader Tom Hougaard, writing about his conversation with pro golfer Luke Donald:

  Back in 2007 I was invited to the Wimbledon tennis final. My friend was a big name in the media industry, and none other than Ralph Lauren had invited her to the tennis final – with a guest. So, there I was in the VIP tent, and I got to sit next to Luke Donald, who at the time was one of the best golfers in the world.

  He is a softly spoken man, and very polite. We got talking about Tiger Woods, and I asked him a pretty to-the-point question about competing with Tiger.

  “Is Tiger Woods a better golfer than you?”

  I found his answer so incredibly insightful that I never forgot it. He said:

  “I don’t think Tiger is a better golfer than me, if you measure it in how well we putt, or how far we hit the ball, but Tiger Woods does have an amazing ability to forget his mistakes and move on.

  For example, we can be on the 15th and both make a bad putt. By the time we get to tee up on the 16th, it is as if Tiger has wiped his mind of whatever happened on the 15th, and he is totally in the moment.”

  I, on the other hand, will still deal with the mistake I made on the 15th, and it will affect my performance on the 16th.”

  The fear of making a mistake is the worst. No one wants to fail.

  When I write, I can’t care if anyone will read it because that will discourage me from writing about specific topics that “don’t do well.” That is me not fearing failure, not fearing the fact that no one will read this. You are reading this; thank you. Obviously you want people to read what you write, but if no one reads it, I’ll just go write the next post.

  Mesut Özil is the first player that comes to mind when I think of fear of failure, but only for one specific part of his game. He was one of the best passers you’ll ever see, tons of risk, but he would never shoot. If there was a ten percent chance of a pass being available, even though the goal was wide open, he’d pass. It was infuriating to watch.

  I think he was more of a failure when he didn’t take the chance to shoot, not when he missed. When he shot, at least he took the risk, and if he missed, that is fine. Go again for the next shot.

  We should applaud those that take risks.

• An intellectual challenge

  05 September 2024

  Pep Guardiola hired Juanma Lillo as his assistant coach at Manchester City because he wanted an “intellectual challenge.” He says, “I don’t want people agreeing with me all the time. I want people around me who’ll tell me that I should be doing things differently.”

  Excerpt from the book “The Pep Revolution” by Martí Perarnau:

  I chat to Pep by phone on the morning Juanma starts (for obvious reasons dinner isn’t possible). ‘I felt it was really important to bring Juanma in. I need intellectual challenge and Juanma will provide that. I thought about it over the last few months and I think it’s definitely the right decision although not necessarily the easiest option from my point of view. A more conventional assistant would make my life easier but I think I need someone who’s going to challenge me more. I think I can improve, do much more as a coach but, in order to do that, I need someone who’s going to pressure me, who knows more than I do and who’s willing to challenge me. Do you see what I mean?’

  Obviously I completely understand what he means but he seems keen to explain it again: ‘Juanma has so much expertise. He sees things in football that nobody else does. He has a lot of experience and will know exactly how to challenge me. “It’s very possible that we’ll disagree regularly and even end up fighting. But he’ll insist that I check everything I do every day and will question if it’s the right thing to do. It’s the intellectual challenge I need. I don’t want people agreeing with me all the time. I want people around me who’ll tell me that I should be doing things differently. And Juanma is perfect for that. I’ve thought about it long and hard at home. If I’d wanted to make things easy for myself I’d have picked someone else but I’m not here to take things easy. I’m here to work hard and keep getting better.

  ‘I’m completely serious about needing intellectual challenge. I want to do everything better, be a better coach, take one more step on the ladder. And I really think that Juanma’s the man to help me do that. It won’t be easy but it’s exactly what I need.”

  You will remember Juanma Lillo from this post “Football is finished”, where he argues against managers like Pep who have a lot of control and influence over where each player moves, how they move, who they pass to, and where they can’t move. Juanma Lillo seems to clearly disagree with this approach.

  Therefore, when you bring him in, it is no surprise why last season we saw more positional rotations, more emphasis on the diagonals, and then this season we’re seeing players being given more and more freedom.

  But think about it. Arguably the best coach and the best manager in the world wants to continue to improve. He is not content with simply winning; he never stops learning. He is the best right now, but he has that mindset that someone is hungrier.

  Why are we content if he is not?

• Thiago Motta's teams are both positional and relational

  04 September 2024

  Juventus manager Thiago Motta found “it difficult” to define the way his former team Bologna played as either positional or relational because they adapted the way they played depending on how they thought the opponent would defend against them.

  Speaking in February 2024, as current manager of Bologna, at the University of Bologna for the ‘All About Soccer’ conference (translation from Italian courtesy of Juani Jimena):

  Yes, I find it difficult to define myself as one thing or another, positional or relational. I think that our current game is a mixture of positional and relational football because, in the end, it changes.

  For example, we played games against Lazio, which is a team that defends a lot in zone. But also because of the characteristics of our team, of our players, and of the guys we have at our disposal today, we think that we have to respect and have an organization in terms of roles and positioning on the pitch.

  What we can take advantage of by observing the opposing teams is to look for spaces where it is very difficult for the opposing teams to defend.

  The next game, in Bergamo, we will face a team that individually is a very strong team that does not let the opponent play, and in that case it is not enough just to have positions. We will need the relationship between our players and also to have this intuition on the pitch. Respect between them to be able to relate, play together, and respect our organization because it is very important, especially when we defend, also when we attack, when we have consolidated possession, or when we are a compact team and we have to defend.

  Then there are the transitions that are a little more difficult to control. Luckily, today we are doing very well. Also, taking into account the last game, we are doing very well in the transitions. But in the possession and non-possession phase, against a team like Atalanta, for example, we have to be good at moving, respecting each other, looking at each other, communicating.

  Malmö manager Henrik Rydström said something similar recently.

  Even though this is an older interview, I’d have to imagine Thiago Motta applies the same thinking when he manages Juventus game in and game out. Not every game is the same; he adapts to the opponent to take advantage of their weaknesses. He doesn’t blindly follow a game model if it will hinder the objective, to win.

  Winning is the most powerful tool for those that want to move away from copy and paste positional football. No one cares unless you win.

  Teams that are candidates to apply relational principles to their play are ones that have versatile players who can play two or more different positions. Those teams are chameleons; they can adapt to any formation, any movement. Maximum unpredictability.

• Barcelona's three forwards remain wide and equidistant when they make their runs into the box

  03 September 2024

  Barcelona’s forwards deliberately space their runs out, equidistant to each other, when they break into the box. That makes it very hard to defend against because of how spread out and the unorthodox nature of Raphinha, Lewandowski, and Dani Olmo’s runs.

  

  Against Real Valladolid, Raphinha played as an inside forward from the left, pushing closer to Robert Lewandowski, and Dani Olmo was drifting back and forth behind Raphinha and Lewandowski, but he would often end up on the far side, attacking the back post.

  Teams normally instruct their players to curve their runs to arrive into certain spaces when the ball is played into the box, but these three Barcelona players were making a conscious effort to not only arrive into certain spaces but also maintain a specific distance between each other.

  That gray line in Figure 1.1 is the run a player would normally make if they were in Dani Olmo’s position. Robert Lewandowski attacks the near post, and then Olmo comes in behind him to the penalty spot for the pass once Raphinha receives the ball.

  But Dani Olmo curves his run to the outside, even though he is unmarked. It’s deliberate movement to remain equidistant to Lewandowski, with Raphinha holding his run to remain equidistant. All three work in tandem. Dani Olmo attacks the far post at an angle in towards the goal.

  As Real Valladolid collapse on the ball, if they are outnumbered, it is impossible for them to mark all three players at once. You have to pay close attention to the run on the far post because it is wider than normal.

  Match: Barcelona 7-0 Real Valladolid, 31 August 2024

• Liverpool had no specific game plan to press Manchester United during their build up

  02 September 2024

  Arne Slot said that Liverpool did not have a “specific plan” to defend against Manchester United’s buildup. Their defense was dictated by how they wanted to attack. Keeping Salah and Diaz high, with Szoboszlai on the left, attacked United’s weaknesses.

  

  Arne Slot when asked if Liverpool had a game plan on how to press Manchester United, when United were building up from the back in an interview post-match with Sky Sports:

  There’s not a specific game plan (when defending against Manchester United’s) buildup from the back. We always want to press the opponent high; that’s what Jurgen (Klopp) did (last season; that’s what we tried to continue. The game plan was more when we had the ball, where normally in the last two games, Dominic (Szoboszlai) played more from the right; today we played him from the left. But without the ball, we always tried to press as high as we can, and we scored, I think, a few goals from the high press.

  Every thought they have relates back to their attack. Classic school of Johan Cruyff mentality, aggressive in all phases of play on and off the pitch.

  Having Dominic Szoboszlai on the left accomplishes several things.

  Ryan Gravenberch normally plays on the right behind Szoboszlai. Having Szoboszlai on the left means that Gravenberch had a natural avenue forward to help press their right. Gravenberch didn’t have to fully commit to press either.

  That means Szoboszlai can target Kobbie Mainoo more aggressively, as he is United’s best midfielder; he could even make a case to say he is their best player on the day. Casemiro was the weak link in Manchester United’s buildup. Casemiro normally plays on the right, but he drifted ahead of Mainoo in the buildup.

  When Casemiro moved forward, Gravenberch could attack him from behind. Or when Joshua Zirkzee dropped from center-forward, Gravenberch could follow him. Gravenberch had the out ball covered and was applying pressure to Mainoo when he moved to United’s left.

  All the pressure is on United’s left side to work the ball out from the back because Szoboszlai, Diogo Jota, and Luis Diaz overload their right. Diogo Dalot can’t bomb forward to overload right-back Trent Alexander-Arnold or invert into the midfield as often because he has to move wide to help Lisandro Martinez on United’s left.

  

  

  Their fullbacks, nine out of ten times they are really high, and then Casemiro comes in between, so if you pick the ball, if you can keep (Luis Diaz) and (Mohamed Salah) high, then you’re constantly in a one-v-one situation. And then you need midfielders that can run, and we had three of them today that kept on running, and if they arrive in a duel, that they are aggressive enough to win it. That was, I think, one of the main reasons why we could win today.

  Having Szoboszlai on the left means that their main attacking target, Mohamed Salah, was always more free on the far side, the right side of the attack. I’d take Lisandro Martinez one-v-one versus Mohamed Salah nine times out of ten, any day of the week.

  Diogo Jota was dropping off from a center-forward position, moving behind Dominic Szoboszlai, allowing Szoboszlai to run through between Salah and Diaz to pressure the man with the ball, whether that be a center-back or midfielder.

  If the ball was passed forward, they wanted someone in the back of that player to win a duel and then spring an attack. If the man receiving was facing United’s goal Dominic Szoboszlai, Ryan Gravenberch, Alexis Mac Alister, or a defender moved full speed towards the ball carrier as the ball was passed forward. If they were facing upfield one of the forwards could come from behind with the team collapsing on the ball from all sides.

  All four of Liverpool’s goals (including the one that was disallowed for offsided) resulted from a turnover; three from duels won and one from a passing error by Casemiro in Manchester United’s half of the field.

  Because of how aggressively United position themselves, Kobbie Mainoo is more likely to try to get forward. When Szoboszlai wins the ball, he can turn and then play towards Salah’s side to play him through.

  

  Arne Slot on Manchester United’s change to a 4-4-2 this season:

  I see them, in my opinion, working harder if the ball is being played through them. So they run more.

  We all remember the massive space Liverpool created last season at Old Trafford. Making them run, tiring them, is key to dominating them.

  If you get past their first and second line, they’re running and running and running the entire match. Like a Basketball game, a constant game of many transitions with massive amounts of space. Liverpool can stretch the pitch wider than they normally would with the fullbacks spread wider, to take advantage of United’s two front lines pushed high up the pitch and their defensive line far back in their own end.

  All of that defensive organization from Liverpool comes together because of the plan they laid out in attack. Defend to attack. It’s as simple as marking the closet man and pressing when the ball is played forward to United’s midfield. The emphasis on the press is more on applying pressure to United’s midfield than the backline.

  Match: Manchester United 0-3 Liverpool, 1 September 2024

• Arsenal in limbo against Brighton's mid-block

  01 September 2024

  Something unusual happens when Arsenal plays against teams that defend in a mid-block. They get stuck in limbo in this middle ground where they can’t attack the space behind the opposition’s high line, and they can’t pin the opposition back in their box.

  

  

  Kai Havertz, Bukayo Saka, and Martin Ødegaard don’t offer enough pace to threaten a run in-behind Brighton’s high defensive line.

  They can attempt a run, but the timing of the runs isn’t in sync with each pass. Say for example Kai Havertz; he is pealing off into space as Declan Rice receives the ball. By the time Rice takes his first touch, Havertz is still holding his run to stay onside.

  Bukayo Saka is ready for a pass in-behind, but if the pass were to be played over the top, it would be him versus three or more other defenders because neither Kai Havertz nor Martin Ødegaard are ready to help.

  

  

  Based on the way those ahead of the ball are making their runs forward and the timing at which they make the runs, it seems that the goal is to pin the opposition back into their own box so that Arsenal can pick away at them.

  Those runs create space for the man receiving the ball. Make the run before the ball is played; push a defender back, creating space behind the run.

  But every time Arsenal would work the ball close to Brighton’s box, they’d work the ball back, and then Brighton would step out, back into that higher line, and Arsenal would have to reset again.

  The game was stuck, and the only way they could break the tension was to wait for Brighton to make a mistake, because they only need one. Lewis Dunk finally made that one mistake in the 38th minute, Kai Havertz is played through, and there is the opening goal.

  I’m not sure what the solution is right now, but Aston Villa defends in a similar manner, and they encounter the same challenges when attempting to attack against them.

  Match: Arsenal 1-1 Brighton, 31 August 2024

• We don't really see the formation as the end goal

  31 August 2024

  When asked by Brentford manager Thomas Frank “why do you change your formation so many times,” then Chelsea manager Graham Potter said that he “doesn’t see the formation as the end goal.” I don’t use formation numbers in my writing for that same reason.

  Graham Potter speaking with Thomas Frank pitch-side in 2022:

  We don’t really see the formation as the end goal. We see that actually how the team’s playing. The team needs to look consistent regardless of the formation. And then it’s about the personnel, about how you want to attack the opponent, how you want to defend against the opponent. Those are some of the other things we consider. Hopefully there’s things that look the same even though the shape changes.

  Thomas Frank mentioned later in the conversation that in the “modern game”, at the top level, there is a lot of formation shifts.

  The position of each player changes depending on where the ball is. To assign a telephone number like 4-3-3, 3-4-3, 5-2-3, 4-4-2, 3-1-6, and so on to a play oversimplifies things to the point that it almost becomes misleading or confusing.

  I can take a snapshot of a play and then assign a series of numbers, but that doesn’t offer enough value. That is one single frame of a ninety minute match. One small change in position makes a massive difference.

  I had to draw what Arne Slot was saying yesterday to understand what he meant when he mentioned an eight, a nine, and an eleven, and where each player was in relation to the other.

  One second a player is a left-back, then a left midfielder, and then maybe a center midfielder, and then a left-winger, and then back to a left-back. Do you call that player a left-back, a left wing-back, or a left-midfielder? Does it matter?

  Sure, there is a common theme like a sub-structure if the team is consistent, as Graham Potter mentions when he says “Hopefully there’s things that look the same even though the shape changes,” but the players are constantly moving elsewhere, dropping, pushing up, compressing, expanding.

  It is like trying to assign a set of values to the water in a water balloon as it explodes. Sure, the location of this droplet is X in the first frame, but in the tenth frame the droplet is now Y. In the end it is a bit pointless because the movements are more fluid.

  Out of possession structure is more predictable and consistent than in possession structure. Most teams defend in a 4-4-2, but that number 4-4-2 doesn’t describe how narrow the four midfield are, who is marking who, who triggers the press, and so on. There’s more details there to delve in to.

• Fight or flight

  30 August 2024

  Malmö apply relational principles to their play, but when things get tough in a match, they retreat back to rigid positional play. The question now is why isn’t your team retreating to relational principles when a match is easy?

  Mark Lievisse Adriaanse writing about Henrik Rydström and Malmö for NRC (translated to English from Dutch):

  Rydström, says Moisander, “is not a dictator.” During the week, Malmö trains according to Rydström’s ideas, and mutual relationships are formed. “But before the match, he doesn’t give clear instructions that you shouldn’t do certain things or that you should do certain things.” During the match against Halmstads, it is noticeable that Rydström does not stand on the sidelines shouting for instructions. Sometimes he calls a player over to him to ask questions about the match and then to join in the conversation.

  Many trainers have the “illusion of control,” says Rydström himself. They want to dictate exactly where players should stand. For Rydström, the principles of the game are “non-negotiable.” For example, to look for diagonal passes through the opponent’s lines. And by luring the opponent out of their normal positions with an ‘overload’ on one flank and then playing them over.

  By keeping a single outfield player on the other flank, the game can also be shifted to an area where there is a lot of space. If the ball is lost in the crowd, he says, it is easier to win it back. But in the execution of these principles, players have a lot of freedom. The point, says Rydström, is to create a framework within which players have the space for their own creativity, expression, and initiative.

  The first manager I think of when I read this is Real Madrid manager Carlo Ancelotti. His way of approaching managing a game sounds similar. This is a style of play built for those that excel at man management. Putting players in an environment where they will excel on their own. Allowing them to find their own solutions.

  There has to be a lot of trust that has to be built between the manager and the players because the onus is on those on the pitch. The players have to be confident in themselves to not be afraid to make mistakes when they take a risk without instructions.

  It sounds great to me because it is unpredictable. Why wouldn’t you want your team to play like this if they could do it and win?

  Some people prefer predictability. Eleven players perfectly choreographing movements on a pitch is beautiful.

  Teams are afraid to lose because they need the money. They need to finish in the top four. They need to win silverware. Fanbases want easy wins; they want titles. Managers have to fulfill expectations.

  The style only matters if you win, and Malmö win matches.

  When things get tough during a match, players fall back into old positional patterns, Rydström says after the match against the stubborn, defensive Halmstads. Sometimes they even started playing the long ball. “Why?” he says in frustration. At the same time, he acknowledges, those larger spaces also made it harder for Halmstads to defend.

  Fight or flight. The team reverts back to positional play because you don’t want to be surprised when you are under attack. You want everything to be predictable. You want to close your eyes and know where everyone else is on the pitch.

  If everyone is in fight or flight, why wouldn’t you want to take advantage and go on the offensive by playing more unpredictably?

• The difference in distance when Liverpool's fullbacks are wide versus when they are narrow

  29 August 2024

  Arne Slot wants Liverpool’s fullbacks to stay as narrow as the opponent’s press allows, to minimize the distance between players so they can move the ball between players “faster from one foot to another” and to give the opponent “less time to defend.”

  

  

  Arne Slot speaking with Sky Sports:

  The idea of the fullbacks not being that wide, and it depends also what the press, what the other teams will give us. But if the fullbacks are all down the line and you play the fullback, then he is very far away from some other players. And it takes really long to get the ball over there, so if you are playing closer to each other, then the ball goes faster from one foot to another, and that gives less to the opponent to defend.

  

  I think Trent (Alexander-Arnold) has been used in the past, and we will use him also during this season, a lot on the inside, but the way they (Ipswich Town) pressed was with nine, ten, and their (left-winger) went all the way to Ryan Gravenberch. And when we play to Trent, then the left midfielder, the number eight, stepped out towards him. Then it’s not a smart idea to play on the inside because then the distance is really short between the midfielder and Trent, so then it’s smarter to stay wider because then the distance for him to run is longer, create more time for Trent.

  

  We did speak at halftime that he should be wider to make distance between the one who wanted to press him longer, which creates more time for him.

  Another thing they changed was to have Dominic Szoboszlai rotate out wide more often to allow Trent Alexander-Arnold to move inside into the right half-space. Szoboszlai is an underrated defender in wide areas.

  The narrowness of Liverpool is the greatest feature currently because of how quickly it allows them to move the ball from back to front on the ground. It is the most direct way to play without playing through the air. It squeezes the ball forward.

• The players you have

  28 August 2024

  The tactical changes that Manchester City made this season are a result of the players that they don’t have, some luck, and immense versatility. It is tailored towards runners, but what happens when those players are subbed off? It changes.

  

  In this position defenders Nathan Ake, Manuel Akanji, or Josko Gvardiol would be receiving the ball on the left, not Kevin De Bruyne.

  • With Nathan Ake, he would see the run, but the timing of the pass was usually off. Haaland would make the run, and the pass wouldn’t be played.
  • Josko Gvardiol rarely attempted that pass due to his heavier touch, but he was the one most likely to receive it in that specific position on the pitch higher up, almost acting as a left-winger.
  • Manuel Akanji never looked for that pass because he is right-footed; the angle a player would receive the ball on the left doesn’t suit a right-footed player to play a pass on their second touch.

  Of all three, Nathan Ake was the most likely to find that key pass. Why sign Erling Haaland if you can’t play him in behind the opposition’s defense at full speed?

  Not only can Kevin De Bruyne put the perfect amount of weight on that pass over the top to Erling Haaland, his timing is also perfect, making him a more reliable passer for Haaland. Every time Haaland makes a run, he’s almost guaranteed to be rewarded with the perfect pass in stride. Haaland can be more efficient with his energy use and can attack the run rather than tepidly signaling to Ake that he needs the pass.

  Rotating wide left into this position on the pitch isn’t new for De Bruyne; he has done it before on dozens of occasions last season, but the higher frequency at which he rotates is new.

  Pep Guardiola speaking about making tactical changes every season to ESPN Brazil:

  It’s to avoid getting bored. If I did the same thing for eight years, I’d get bored, first of all. And second, when you do something that works, opponents watch and find an antidote.

  If we go through the middle, they close it off. Too wide, they go wider. Anything and they react, we have to counter-react. And the players you have. What specific characteristics and how they adapt best to the way you play.

  This system is more geared towards going wider, and it is a credit to the versatility of the team that they can shift like a chameleon. I see this as their secondary system. Their main system is geared more to their best players, who are specialists in smaller spaces, but the problem is that they haven’t been available. Without Rodri, it is hard to play through the middle, so this is a new solution.

  Once you add Rodri, John Stones, and Phil Foden in with İlkay Gündoğan, Bernardo Silva, Jack Grealish, Jérémy Doku, and Mateo Kovacic, you’ll be playing through the middle.

  And then what happens when Kyle Walker splits minutes with Rico Lewis? Walker won’t invert, that then probably means Josko Gvardiol plays that left-back to left-wing role he played last season. Alternatively, that could mean Rico Lewis inverts from the left.

  There is always at least one experiment happening in this team. There are so many different options due to the versatility; your head could spin; you’ll never get bored.

• Chelsea staggering their pivot

  27 August 2024

  Staggering each line of players makes a huge difference. Chelsea midfielders Enzo Fernandez and Moises Caicedo stagger, and that opens up the pass forward out to the wing, draws a defender in, and creates space for Caicedo once they continue up the wing.

  

  That pass to Enzo Fernandez from Moises Caicedo is possible because he is closer to the passer, the goalkeeper, Robert Sanchez, than Caicedo is. They are staggered.

  That allows Chelsea to play a positive pass forward within three passes. Two Wolves players are drawn towards Enzo and Caicedo central as they attempt to collapse on the ball. That opens space wide.

  

  When Enzo and Caicedo aren’t staggered, they can’t pass between each other from the goalkeeper. One or the other would have to pass back to a center-back to play out to the wing.

  That also allows the central Wolves players to anticipate the pass to the fullback and winger on the right, creating less space out wide while still remaining compact central.

  It is predictable, and there is less space.

  

  As the ball is played up the wing, the Wolves defender closest to Caicedo has to plant their feet and pivot their hips to engage the fullback out wide. That gives the fullback more time on the ball before they are forced to make their next pass.

  Once the pass is played to the right-winger, Caicedo is then left unmarked behind Chelsea’s front line.

  

  Compare that to when they pass up the right wing from a flat pivot that isn’t staggered; the space is much smaller. The Wolves defenders don’t have to work very hard to stay compact, closing off space centrally. Neither Caicedo nor Enzo can break free into space to offer themselves up for a pass.

  That is the effect of two players staggering; now imagine the entire team moving unpredictably, staggering, and shifting positions to open space. Attacking midfielders switching sides. That is what Chelsea did against Wolves. They were less rigid, and I did not expect them to adapt their play to this so quickly.

  Match: Wolves 2-6 Chelsea, 25 August 2024

• Which Liverpool players benefit in transition or when the opposition defends deep?

  26 August 2024

  In transition, Mohamed Salah benefits. Against teams that defend deep, the forwards on the left benefit. But the center-forward will always be the focal point for Liverpool, and that is why I’m excited to see Darwin Nunez’s pace up top.

  

  When the opposition defense steps out to press or if they choose to defend in a midblock in settled play, Salah tends to position himself closer to the right half-space, with the center-forward pushing more towards the left wing.

  The left winger and the center forward aren’t the target in transition, Salah is. More so than last season.

  It almost feels like a track meet at times, with Salah waiting to spring forward beyond the opposition’s defense. It is telegraphed; they don’t hide it.

  

  Liverpool can go straight over the top to Salah, but they also love those straight up and down, give-and-go passes, to play the ball through. The fullbacks Trent Alexander-Arnold and Andrew Robertson sit more narrow, meaning the ball almost gets squeezed through to the front line.

  The two forwards on the left need to make up a lot of ground once that ball is played through because their starting position is closer to the left wing than the right wing. The main problem is that Salah doesn’t have the same pace as he once had; he can’t do it alone. Without pace on the left, they can’t take advantage of those easy-through balls. That is why Arne Slot’s teams must have fast forwards.

  I think Darwin Nunez is going to thrive because having that amount of pace on the end of the second pass, after the through pass to Salah, will be a cheat code once they dial it in. He will be undroppable. Luis Diaz, Cody Gakpo, and Diogo Jota don’t bring that same level of explosiveness. They are more controlled.

  

  Against a team that defends deep, Salah will play a more auxiliary role, with the two forwards on the left now pushed into the center, in the box. Once Salah receives the ball, Trent Alexander-Arnold automatically makes that underlapping run, and then they can cross.

  In these types of games, they won’t need pace, and they will benefit from having forwards that offer more control, but they’ll still want pace because they are at their most dangerous in transition.

  

  To get Salah into scoring position, he will need to go on a long one-touch pass-and-go journey across the top of the box. Or he can drift inside, pushing one of the midfielders outside.

• Lyon — Monaco: Uninspiring (0-2)

  25 August 2024

  Lyon and Monaco both put on dull, slow, and uninspiring performances in a game filled with errors. Monaco had a hard time trying to generate clear-cut chances despite Lyon’s inability to complete their passes.

  Read the article on Between The Posts.

• Arsenal's right wing malfunctions against Aston Villa

  25 August 2024

  Three Aston Villa players were positioning themselves in line in front of Bukayo Saka to not allow him to attack at his favored angle without abandoning marking him while tracking the underlapping or overlapping run of an Arsenal midfielder or Ben White.

  

  There were always at least two players out to mark Bukayo Saka every time he received the ball, but they marked him in an unorthodox way.

  One defender would go out to challenge him from a distance, and then another would pull up behind the first defender. That second defender would move in line with the first defender. Those two defenders do three things.

  Saka likes to receive and then drive forward at an angle. That second defender is key to stopping that run forward because, by positioning himself in line with the first defender, he stands directly in the path of Saka if he were to attempt to dribble forward immediately after receiving the ball, after passing and moving, or during a one-two.

  It is like an invisible wall has been put up. It looks like he can attack that space because they are giving him space, but once he does, they collapse, and he has nowhere to go.

  The second thing it does is that it somewhat neutralizes the overlapping and underlapping runs into that zone on the edge or inside the box, where White, Saka, and Ødegaard like to cross from.

  A third defender joins, and then those three defenders divide the wing into three parts. If one of White, Saka, Ødegaard, or someone else attempts to make a run behind into that zone, one of those defenders can track their run. But they don’t have to immediately move to track them. They let them make the run and tried to draw them offside with the rest of the defense.

  

  The third thing this does is that it cuts off the pass to center-forward Kai Havertz when he comes over to help.

  If any of those players breaks past those three defenders and they don’t trigger an offside, all three defenders and the left center-back can collapse on the ball, Their position further away from Saka, divided into those two or three separate sections, allows them to quickly collapse and constrict the play until they win back the ball, force Arsenal into a rushed cross that may go out for a corner, or force them back.

  It wasn’t until the second half, when that second defender wasn’t as disciplined in positioning in line with the first defender, allowing Havertz to sneak in or Saka to make a run into that zone from his favored angle, that Arsenal began to create their usual meaningful chances, which ultimately led to goals.

  Match: Aston Villa 0-2 Arsenal, 24 August 2024

To view all of the posts, visit the archive or search at the top of the page.